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Abstract 
This study considers Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in Cournot markets with 
endogenous entry and investigates the effects of CSR on environmental taxation and welfare 
consequences. We show that the optimal tax under free entry is higher than that under 
blockaded entry and also higher than marginal environmental damage. We then show that a 
higher taxation is socially excessive from the viewpoint of socially optimal CSR, which requires 
an appropriate regulatory framework for CSR promotion. Finally, we show that the 
environment is less damaged but social welfare deteriorates accompanied with CSR when the 
fixed cost is low, while pollution abatement activities will reduce the optimal tax and improves 
both environmental quality and social welfare. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent decades, as the world’s economy is moving towards higher levels of globalization and 
economic liberalization, the renewal of regulated markets which includes not only the abolition of entry 
restrictions but the creation of environmental protections has been extensively implemented. In practice, 
government has continuously conducted not only command-and-control environmental regulations such 
as best available technology standards and subsidies, but also market-based environmental regulations 
such as taxes and cap-and-trades.  
Regarding environmental taxation, various studies have explored the effect of taxation in imperfect 
competition markets. In specific, in a blockaded entry market where the number of firms is fixed, the 
optimal tax rate is equal to the marginal environmental damage in perfect competition markets while it 
falls short of the marginal damage in imperfect competition markets. In a free-entry market where the 
number of firms is endogenously determined, however, the optimal tax might be higher (or lower) than 
the marginal environmental damage because the tax effect on the output can be offset by the effect on 
the number of entering firms.1 Thus, under the liberalization policy the environmental tax can work for 
reducing excessive entry, which is caused by a business-stealing effect in an oligopolistic competition.2 
Recently, corporate social responsibility (CSR) becomes much popular in the business economics, 
contrary to the traditional view of profit maximization as the sole objective of a private firm. Since the 
pioneering analysis of Porter and Kramer (2006), CSR has now become a mainstream global business 
strategy and a large number of firms in the world issue various CSR statements/activities. 3 GE’s 
Ecomagination program, Nestle’s Creating Shared Values, and Unilevel’s Simple Living Plan are 
excellent examples. Nowadays, more and more firms are gradually adopting corporate self-disciplines 
that take more into account than profits, i.e., that regard ethical issues and community welfare as 
important business routines.  
This aspect has also motivated the recent economic analysis of mixed oligopolies in which profit-
oriented private firms compete with not-for profit firms. For example, regarding CSR-firm as a 
consumer-friendly firm, which cares for consumer surplus, Goering (2012, 2014) and Brand and Grothe 
                                           
1 See Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas (1995) and Lee (1999). In the subsequent research, it is proved that the optimal 
emission tax rate in free-entry markets depends on the curvature of market demand (Requate, 2007), the degree of 
product differentiation (Fujiwara, 2009), the output elasticity of emissions (Sugeta, 2017) and consumers 
awareness (Hsu et al., 2017). However, all these analysis still support that the optimal tax can reduce excessive 
entry. 
2 There has been considerable interest in examining the excessive entry problem in the free entry oligopolistic 
markets since the pioneering studies by Mankiw and Whinston (1986) and Suzumura and Kiyono (1987). See, for 
example, Suzumura (2012) and Wang et al. (2014) reviewed the recent analysis on the excessive-entry theorem. 
3 According to KPMG (2013), nearly 92% of the 250 largest companies worldwide issued CSR reports and more than 30% 
(71% and 90%) of companies in the US (the UK and Japan, respectively) adopted CSR in 2013.  
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(2013, 2015) examined a vertical supply chain and Matsumura and Ogawa (2014) and Kopel and Brand 
(2014) analysed horizontal products differentiation. Also, Wang et al. (2012), Chang et al. (2014) and 
Liu et al. (2018) explored strategic tariff policy and Liu et al. (2015) and Leal et al. (2018) examined 
the environmental policy.  
This paper extends their analysis of CSR-initiatives into the polluting industry with endogenous 
entry under environmental taxation. Our approach is different with the standard analysis of mixed 
oligopolies where private firms compete with a public firm in free entry markets.4 Cato (2008) shows 
that nationalization policy is preferable to a privatization policy if the public firm earns positive profit, 
which also supports the result in Matsumura and Kanda (2005). But, they assume that the external costs 
vary exogenously with aggregate outputs and the public firm fully internalizes the environmental 
externality without considering environmental policy. On the contrary, our approach takes the analysis 
of Pal and Saha (2015), Xu et al. (2016) and Lee and Xu (2018), who examine the optimal emission tax 
when the public firm takes abatement activities but does not fully internalize the environmental 
externality. But, they concentrate on the blockaded entry markets and did not consider the liberalization 
policy on free entry markets. 
In this paper, we emphasize the role of CSR-firm in free entry markets and investigate the impact 
of the CSR on the optimal environmental tax. The analysis delivers a simple result that the CSR-firm 
facing endogenous entry are always aggressive compared to the private firms and thus it produces larger 
output. This result is comparable with the analysis of Lambertini and Tampiere (2015) and Leal et al. 
(2018) under Cournot duopoly, who showed that CSR-firm produces larger output, which induces rivals 
to reduce their output. Thus, under blockaded entry a higher taxation than the marginal environmental 
damage can be optimal to the society when the firm adopts CSR activities too high. However, when 
entry is endogenous, a larger production of the CSR-firm leads to the small number of firms, which will 
reduce the excessive entry in free entry market. Further, a higher taxation can also reduce firm’s output, 
but it can also indirectly increase firm’s output by reducing the number of firms. Since the excessive 
entry problem can be significant, the optimal environmental tax will be higher than the marginal 
environmental damage even in the small degree of CSR.5 However, we also show that a higher taxation 
is socially excessive from the viewpoint of socially optimal degree of CSR. This implies that an 
                                           
4 In the literature of mixed oligopolies, various studies have examined the welfare effect of privatization in a free-
entry market and showed that the presence of a public firm can serve as an alternative to direct entry regulations 
in precluding excessive-entry problems. See, for example, Matsumura and Kanda (2005), Brandao and Castro 
(2007), Ino and Matsumura (2010), Cato and Matsumura (2012, 2015), Wang (2016), Xu et al. (2017) and Xu and 
Lee (2018). 
5 Note that the market role of CSR-firm to increase the output aggressively can be interpreted as that of Stackelberg 
leadership with dominant private or public firms. Regarding the output and welfare effects of the Stackelberg 
leadership, see Etro (2008) and Ino and Matsumura (2010, 2012). 
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appropriate regulatory framework is necessary for promoting CSR. 
We also compare the result in the blockaded entry markets where the government can set entry 
regulations, and show that the optimal tax under free entry should be higher than that under blockaded 
entry. It implies that the socially excessive entry problem calls for a higher environmental taxation even 
with a CSR-firm, but it depends on the degree of CSR. Therefore, the active role of governmental 
guideline for CSR, rather than considering it on a voluntary basis, is necessary.6 Finally, we show that 
the environment is less damaged but social welfare deteriorates accompanied with a CSR-firm when the 
fixed cost is low, while pollution abatement activities will reduce the optimal tax in free entry markets 
but improve environmental quality and social welfare.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the basic model. In 
Section 3, we examine the optimal environmental tax in free entry markets. In Section 4, we compare 
and discuss the effects of CSR-firm on the optimal tax under entry regulation and pollution abatement 
activities, respectively. Section 5 concludes the analysis. 
2. The model 
We consider a mixed market with a CSR-firm and n private firms (𝑛 > 0) producing homogeneous 
goods. Contrary to profit-maximizing private firms, a CSR-firm, denoted by firm 0, cares for not only 
its profits but also consumer surplus. The inverse demand function is linear, given by 𝑃 = 𝐴 − 𝑄, where 
𝑃 is the market price, 𝑄 = 𝑞0 + ∑ 𝑞𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1  is the market output, and the amount of the good produced by 
firm i is 𝑞𝑖, i =1,2,...,n. Without loss of generality, each firm has the same quadratic cost function,
7 
𝐶(𝑞𝑗) =
1
2
𝑞𝑗
2 + 𝐹, where F is the fixed entry cost and j =0,1,...,n. Each unit of the good produced by 
firms creates one unit of pollutant (i.e., 𝑒𝑗 = 𝑞𝑗). The government imposes an environmental tax t per 
unit of pollutant emitted. Then, the profit function of firm j is 
𝜋𝑗 = 𝑃𝑞𝑗 −
1
2
𝑞𝑗
2 − 𝐹 − 𝑡𝑞𝑗 .
                                                   (1)
 
                                           
6 The promotion of CSR has become a top priority in the policy agenda for sustainable development in many 
countries and international organization. Further encouragement of CSR became a central policy objective in the 
United States and European Union. For example, the UK government website (http://www.csr.gov.uk/policy.shtml) 
stated that: “The Government can provide a policy and institutional framework that stimulates [socially responsible] 
companies to raise their performance [voluntarily] beyond minimum legal standards. Our approach is to encourage 
and incentivize the adoption of CSR, through best practice guidance, and, where appropriate, intelligent [soft-law] 
regulation and fiscal incentives.” See also Steurer (2010). 
7 Since the pioneering study of De Fraja and Delbono (1989) in a mixed market, many researchers have assumed 
the same production efficiency between the firms. Matsumura and Kanda (2005) present some useful arguments 
on the increasing cost function.  
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We first consider free entry markets in a long-run equilibrium where private firms can enter a market 
without entry regulation. That is, the number of the private firms is determined at the point where the 
profit of the private firms is zero (𝜋𝑖 = 0) in a free-entry equilibrium. 
We assume that the production process causes environmental pollution and each unit of the good 
produced by firms creates one unit of pollutant (i.e., 𝑒𝑗 = 𝑞𝑗).
8 We use a linear environmental damage 
function, for the sake of analytic simplicity, 𝐸𝐷 = 𝑑𝑄 , where d denotes marginal environmental 
damage. The government imposes an environmental tax t per unit of pollutant emitted and the tax 
revenue is defined as 𝑇 = 𝑡𝑄. Then, if the environmental tax is equal to the marginal damage, i.e., t = d, 
the tax revenue is equal to the environmental damage. 
The social welfare is defined as the sum of consumer surplus, total profits of firms, and tax revenue, 
minus environmental damage: 
𝑊 = 𝐶𝑆 + 𝜋0 + ∑ 𝜋𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝑇 − 𝐸𝐷 ,                                               (2) 
where 𝐶𝑆 =
1
2
Q2 . We assume that a private firm seeks profit maximization, whereas a CSR-firm 
considers not only its own profits but also consumer surplus. That is, we assume that CSR initiative 
includes both profitability and consumer surplus, as a proxy of its own concern on consumers, and thus 
the objective of the CSR-firm is a combination of consumers surplus and its own profit:9 
𝐺 = 𝜋0 + α𝐶𝑆 ,                                                           (3) 
where α ∈ [0,1] indicates the weight assigned to consumer. It is also interesting to note that when the 
environmental tax is equal to the marginal damage (i.e., 𝑡 = 𝑑) and full consideration of consumer 
surplus (i.e., α = 1), the social welfare in (2) equals the objective of the CSR-firm in (3) at the free 
entry equilibrium where all private firms earn zero profits. 
The game runs as follows. In the first stage, the government sets the environmental tax before firms 
move. In the second stage, given t, each private firm decides whether to enter the market (the entry cost 
is sunk if a private firm enters the market), where the number of private firms is endogenously 
determined by a free-entry market condition (zero-profit condition). In the third stage, the firms compete 
compete in quantities in a Cournot fashion. We solve the game by backward induction to obtain a 
                                           
8 In Section 4.4, we consider the case that polluting firms can choose pollution abatement technology and examine 
how pollution abatement activities affect our results in a mixed market. 
9  This objective function shows that the firm takes its profit-maximizing decision under consumer-oriented 
consideration in which consumer surplus in the market does not fall below a fixed level. This formulation of the 
objective function is comparable with the mixed market where a public firm no longer internalizes environmental 
externalities in its objective function. For more discussion, see Barcena-Ruiz and Garzon (2006), Beladi and Chao 
(2006) and Xu et al. (2016). 
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subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. In the following analysis, we assume that 0 < 𝐹 <
3(2−𝛼)2(𝐴−𝑑)2
2(6−3𝛼+𝛼2)2
 
in order to have interior solutions in the free-entry market. 
3. The analysis of free entry equilibrium 
In the third stage, firm 0 chooses its output level 𝑞𝑜 to maximize its objective function in (3), and 
private firms choose their output levels 𝑞𝑖  to maximize their own profits in (1). The first-order 
conditions are as follows: 
  
𝜕𝐺
𝜕𝑞𝑜
= 𝐴 − 𝑡 − 2𝑞𝑜 − (1 − 𝛼)(𝑞𝑜 + ∑ 𝑞𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ) = 0 ,                            ( 4 ) 
𝜕𝜋𝑖
𝜕𝑞𝑖
= 𝐴 − 𝑡 − 𝑞𝑜 − ∑ 𝑞𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 − 2𝑞𝑖 = 0 .                                           (5) 
Combining (4) and (5), the equilibrium outputs are 
𝑞𝑜 =
(2+𝑛𝛼)(𝐴−𝑡)
2(3+𝑛−𝛼)
  and 𝑞𝑖 =
(2−𝛼)(𝐴−𝑡)
2(3+𝑛−𝛼)
 .                                     (6) 
Note that firm 0 produces more outputs than those of private firm, i.e., 𝑞𝑜 > 𝑞𝑖. Thus, when firm 0 cares 
for consumer surplus, it behaves more aggressively and the concern on consumer surplus expands the 
production. A higher emission tax will reduce the output of firm 0 while the effect of tax on the output 
of the private firm depends on the indirect effect on the number of firms. That is, a larger number of 
firms reduces the output of the private firm because of the business-stealing effect, but it will not affect 
the output of firm 0.  
The equilibrium profits of the firms are 
𝜋0 =
(2+𝑛𝛼)(6−𝛼(4+𝑛))(𝐴−𝑡)2
8(3+𝑛−𝛼)2
− 𝐹 , 𝜋𝑖 =
3(2−𝛼)2(𝐴−𝑡)2
8(3+𝑛−𝛼)2
− 𝐹 .                             (7) 
In the second stage, each private firm earns zero profit in the equilibrium. Under free-entry conditions 
where the profit of private firms in (7) is zero, we can obtain the equilibrium number of private firms: 
  𝑛 =
(2−𝛼)(𝐴−𝑡)
4
√
6
𝐹
+ 𝛼 − 3 .                                               (8) 
Note that private firms exist in a free-entry market only when the tax or/and fixed entry cost is small, 
i.e., 𝑛 > 0 only if 0 < 𝐹 <
3(2−𝛼)2(𝐴−𝑡)2
8(3−𝛼)2
.  Then, we have that the number of private firms decreases 
with higher tax (or/and fixed cost) and higher degree of CSR, i.e., 
𝜕𝑛
𝜕𝑡
< 0, 
𝜕𝑛
𝜕𝐹
< 0 and 
𝜕𝑛
𝜕𝛼
< 0.  
The equilibrium outputs of the firms and total market are as follows: 
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𝑞𝑜 =
𝐴−𝑡
2
𝛼 +
√6𝐹
3
(1 − 𝛼) ,  𝑞𝑖 =
√6𝐹
3
 ,   𝑄 = 𝐴 − 𝑡 −
2√6𝐹
3
 .                         (9) 
Note that the equilibrium output of the private firm is not affected by taxation. It implies that the direct 
effect of taxation to increase the output of the private firm in (6) will be cancelled out by the indirect 
effect of taxation imposed to decrease the number of firms in (8), which will indirectly reduce the output 
of the private firm in (6). 
Finally, the profit of firm 0 is as follows: 
𝜋0 =
√6𝐹𝛼(1+𝛼)(𝐴−𝑡)
6
−
(𝐴−𝑡)2𝛼2
8
−
𝛼(2+𝛼)
3
𝐹 .                                   (10) 
Note that firm 0 can survive in free entry markets, i.e., 𝜋0 ≥ 0 , only when 𝐹0 ≡
3𝛼2(𝐴−𝑡)2
8(2+𝛼)2
≤ 𝐹 <
3(2−𝛼)2(𝐴−𝑡)2
8(3−𝛼)2
 . Otherwise, it will earn negative profits and thus exit (or becomes profit-maximizing 
private firm) in the long-run, i.e., 𝜋0 < 0 when 0 < 𝐹 < 𝐹0. Note that 
𝜕𝐹0
𝜕𝛼
> 0. Thus, a higher degree 
of CSR will reduce the survival range for the CSR-firm in free entry markets. Then, we have two market 
configuations, private market where firm 0 does not exist and mixed market where firm 0 exists, 
depending on the size of fixed cost. 
3.1. Private market 
When the fixed cost is small (0 < 𝐹 < 𝐹0), the CSR-frim does not exist in the long-run equilibrium. 
In a private oligopoly under free entry, we assume that n+1 private firms compete in polluting market.10 
Using the first-order condition in (5), we have the equilibrium outputs and profits of private firms:  
𝑞𝑖 =
𝐴−𝑡
3+𝑛
 , 𝑄 =
(1+𝑛)(𝐴−𝑡)
3+𝑛
 , 𝜋𝑖 =
3(𝐴−𝑡)2
2(3+𝑛)2
− 𝐹 .                                     (11) 
Then, under free-entry conditions, where the profit of private firms in (11) is zero, we can obtain the 
equilibrium number of private firms 
    𝑛 =
1
2
(𝐴 − 𝑡)√
6
𝐹
− 3 .                                                         (12) 
The number of private firms is positive and it decreases as the tax or/and fixed (entry) cost increases.  
Substituting the equilibrium number of private firms into (11), we derive the following equilibrium 
outputs: 
                                           
10 For the comparable results with Section 3.2 where a CSR-firm operates and the total number of firms in the 
market is 𝑛 + 1, we set the number of firms in a private oligopoly as 𝑛 + 1, instead of 𝑛. 
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   𝑞𝑖 =
√6𝐹
3
 ,
 
Q = 𝐴 − 𝑡 −
2√6𝐹
3
 .                                               (13) 
Note that each private firm’s output is also independent of the level of the tax at equilibrium in a private 
oligopoly, i.e., 
𝜕𝑞𝑖
𝜕𝑡
= 0. This is because the equilibrium output of the private firm is determined at the 
zero-profit condition, in which the equilibrium output is exactly the difference between the average cost 
and the marginal cost.11 However, the environmental tax affects not only the number of firms but also 
the total market outputs.  
The resulting consumer surplus, environmental damage, and social welfare are 
𝐶𝑆 =
1
2
(𝐴 − 𝑡 −
2√6𝐹
3
)
2
, 𝐸𝐷 = 𝑑(𝐴 − 𝑡 −
2√6𝐹
3
), 
𝑊 =
1
2
(𝐴 − 𝑡 −
2√6𝐹
3
)(𝐴 + 𝑡 − 2𝑑 −
2√6𝐹
3
) .                                       (14) 
In the first stage, the government chooses the environmental tax to maximize its social welfare in (14). 
The optimal environmental tax is 
  𝑡𝑃 = 𝑑 ,                                                                (15) 
where superscript “P” denotes the equilibrium outcome of this free-entry private market. From equation 
(15), we obtain the following lemma.  
Lemma 1 The optimal environmental tax is exactly determined at the level of marginal environmental 
damage in free entry private market where a CSR-firm does not exist. 
Lemma 1 represents that an environmental tax can be used not only to internalize environmental damage, 
but also to control the number of private firms. A higher taxation directly lowers the firm’s output, it can 
also indirectly increase the firm’s output by reducing the number of firms. And the direct effect of 
taxation on output and the indirect effect on output offset each other. This result is consistent with the 
previous result in Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas (1995) and Lee (1999) who showed that in a private 
market under free entry, the optimal environmental tax should be equal to marginal environmental 
damage.  
Substituting the optimal environmental tax into (12), we can obtain the equilibrium number of 
private firms  
                                           
11 Due to the profit-maximization and zero-profit conditions, each firm’s equilibrium output is the difference 
between average cost and marginal cost. Thus, each firm produces less than the social optimum where the average 
cost equals the marginal cost. This is the so-called business-stealing effect, which causes excessive entry into the 
market. 
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𝑛𝑃 =
𝐴−𝑑
2
√
6
𝐹
− 3 .                                                      ( 16) 
Note that we have 0Pn   in the regions of 0 < 𝐹 <
(𝐴−𝑑)2
24
.   
This yields the optimal output levels of each private firm and market output: 
𝑞𝑖
𝑃 =
√6𝐹
3
 , Q𝑃 = 𝐴 − 𝑑 −
2√6𝐹
3
 .                                                 (17) 
Finally, the consumer surplus, environmental damage, and social welfare are 
𝐶𝑆𝑃 =
1
2
(𝐴 − 𝑑 −
2√6𝐹
3
)
2
, 𝐸𝐷𝑃 = 𝑑(𝐴 − 𝑑 −
2√6𝐹
3
), 𝑊𝑃 =
1
2
(𝐴 − 𝑑 −
2√6𝐹
3
)
2
.         (18) 
It is noteworthy that the social welfare is identical to the consumer surplus in (18) in a free entry private 
oligopoly, i.e., 𝐶𝑆𝑃 = 𝑊𝑃. 
3.2. Mixed market 
When the fixed cost is large ( 𝐹0 ≤ 𝐹 <
3(2−𝛼)2(𝐴−𝑡)2
8(3−𝛼)2
 ), the CSR-frim exists in the long-run 
equilibrium. Using the results in (9), we have consumer surplus, environmental damage, and social 
welfare as follows: 
𝐶𝑆 =
1
2
(𝐴 − 𝑡 −
2√6𝐹
3
)
2
, 𝐸𝐷 = 𝑑(𝐴 − 𝑡 −
2√6𝐹
3
), 
𝑊 =
4−2𝛼−𝛼2
3
𝐹 −
(4𝐴−𝐴𝛼−𝐴𝛼2−4𝑑+𝑡𝛼+𝑡𝛼2)
6
√6𝐹 +
(𝐴−𝑡)(4𝐴−𝐴𝛼2−8𝑑+4𝑡+𝑡𝛼2)
8
 .              (19) 
In the first stage, the government chooses the environmental tax to maximize its social welfare in (19). 
The optimal environmental tax is 
𝑡𝐹 =
1
(4+𝛼2)
(Aα2 + 4𝑑 −
2𝛼(1+𝛼)√6𝐹
3
) ,                                          (20) 
where superscript “F” denotes the equilibrium outcome of this free-entry mixed market. Then, from (20), 
we can derive that 𝑡𝐹 > 𝑑 when12 0 < 𝐹 <
3(2−𝛼)2(𝐴−𝑑)2
2(6−3𝛼+𝛼2)2
. Then we obtain the following lemma. 
Lemma 2 The optimal environmental tax is higher than marginal environmental damage in free entry 
private market where a CSR-firm exists. 
Lemma 2 represents that a higher environmental tax than marginal environmental damage can be used 
                                           
12 Note that 
3(2−𝛼)2(𝐴−𝑑)2
2(6−3𝛼+𝛼2)2
<
3(2−𝛼)2(𝐴−𝑡)2
8(3−𝛼)2
=
6(𝐴−𝑑)2
(4−𝛼)2
. 
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to control the number of private firms when the number is small (due to a higher fixed entry cost). This 
is in contrast to the result in Lemma 1 where a CSR-firm does not exist. The CSR-frim is aggressive in 
producing output, given the number of entering firms, which might increase total outputs and 
environmental damage as well. Thus, a higher taxation that decreases total market outputs is required in 
a mixed market under free entry equilibrium. 
Substituting the optimal environmental tax into (8), we can obtain the optimal number of private 
firms: 
𝑛𝐹 =
(2−𝛼)(𝐴−𝑑)
4+𝛼2
√
6
𝐹
−
2(6−3𝛼+𝛼2)
4+𝛼2
 .                                               (21) 
Then, we have the equilibrium outputs as follows: 
𝑞0
𝐹 =
2(3𝛼(𝐴−𝑑)−√6𝐹(2−2𝛼+𝛼2))
3(4+𝛼2)
 , 𝑞𝑖
𝐹 =
√6𝐹
3
 ,
 
𝑄𝐹 =
2(6𝐴−6𝑑−√6𝐹(4−𝛼))
3(4+𝛼2)
 .                   (22) 
Substituting also these outputs, we can obtain the profit of firm 0 as follows: 
𝜋0
𝐹 =
8√6𝐹𝛼(𝐴−𝑑+𝐴𝛼−𝑑𝛼)
3(4+𝛼2)2
−
2(𝐴−𝑑)2𝛼2
(4+𝛼2)2
−
𝛼(32+8𝛼−𝛼3)
3(4+𝛼2)2
𝐹 .                              (23) 
Hence, the CSR-firm can earn a non-negative profit at free entry equilibrium only when 
6𝛼2(𝐴−𝑑)2
(8+4𝛼+𝛼2)2
≤
𝐹 <
6(𝐴−𝑑)2
(4−𝛼)2
.  
Finally, consumer surplus, environmental damage, and social welfare are as follows: 
𝐶𝑆𝐹 =
2(6𝐴−6𝑑−√6𝐹(4−𝛼))
2
9(4+𝛼2)
2  , 𝐸𝐷
𝐹 =
2𝑑(6𝐴−6𝑑−√6𝐹(4−𝛼))
3(4+𝛼2)
 , 𝑊𝐹 =
2
4+𝛼2
(𝐴 − 𝑑 −
4−𝛼
6
√6𝐹)2 . (24) 
The social welfare increases as the fixed cost becomes smaller, in which case more private firms enter 
the market and thus in return the optimal tax becomes higher. 
4. Policy Discussions 
4.1. The welfare effect of a CSR-firm 
We compare the equilibrium outcomes between private and mixed markets when the CSR-firm 
exists in free entry markets where 
6𝛼2(𝐴−𝑑)2
(8+4𝛼+𝛼2)2
≤ 𝐹 <
6(𝐴−𝑑)2
(4−𝛼)2
. First, we have 𝑛𝑃 > 𝑛𝐹 and 𝑡𝑃 < 𝑡𝐹: a 
higher environmental tax in a mixed market yields a smaller number of private firms. It represents that 
the CSR-firm is beneficial to reduce the excessive entry problem. Second, we have 𝑄𝑃 > 𝑄𝐹: total 
market outputs in a private oligopoly are greater than those in a mixed oligopoly. It implies that the 
CSR-firm is also beneficial to the environment, i.e., 𝐸𝐷𝑃 > 𝐸𝐷𝐹. Third, we have 𝑊𝑃 > 𝑊𝐹 if 𝐹 <
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𝐹𝑤 ≡
3(8+8𝛼+5𝛼2−4(1+𝛼)√4+𝛼2)(𝐴−𝑑)2
2(8+3𝛼)2
 while 𝑊𝑃 < 𝑊𝐹 if 𝐹𝑤 < 𝐹 <
3(2−𝛼)2(𝐴−𝑑)2
2(6−3𝛼+𝛼2)2
 . It shows that a 
CSR-firm is beneficial to both social welfare and environmental quality when fixed cost is large, i.e., 
𝐹𝑤 < 𝐹 <
3(2−𝛼)2(𝐴−𝑑)2
2(6−3𝛼+𝛼2)2
 . Fig. 1 shows the welfare and profit of the CSR-firm in mixed and private 
markets. 
< FIGURE 1. Welfare and profit comparisons under free entry > 
Proposition 1 The environment is less damaged but social welfare deteriorates accompanied with a 
CSR-firm when the fixed cost is low. 
We can provide economic interpretation. A CSR-firm is aggressive and thus it produces outputs at a 
higher cost (also called the production cost-increasing effect), but as it produces more outputs than 
private firms, it can reduce the number of private firms (this is the cost-decreasing effect of the 
duplication of fixed costs). Therefore, the welfare consequences depends on how the two opposite 
effects work. In the case that the fixed cost is lower than a certain level and thus a large number of 
private firms enters the free entry mixed market, the CSR-firm’s production cost-increasing effect is less 
significant than the cost-decreasing effect of the duplication of fixed costs. Therefore, when the fixed 
cost is large, the CSR-firm is beneficial to the society than a private oligopoly. 
The proposition shows that the welfare effects of the CSR-firm depend on the degree of CSR and 
fixed cost. It also implies that an appropriate regulatory framework might be necessary for promoting 
an appropriate degree of CSR. Thus, the active role of governmental guideline for promoting CSR, 
rather than considering it on a voluntary basis, might be useful.13 
4.2. Optimal promotion for CSR 
We examine the optimal promotion of CSR from the viewpoint of welfare, rather than voluntarily 
given degree of CSR in the market selection. Then, the government determines not only the optimal 
environmental tax rate but the optimal degree of CSR. In the first stage, the government chooses the 
degree of CSR promotion and environmental tax to maximize its social welfare in (19). Then, the 
optimality condition of environmental tax in (20) yields the following optimal degrees of CSR 
promotion and environmental tax rate: 
                                           
13 The promotion of CSR has become a priority in the policy agenda for sustainable development in recent years. 
In particular, the encouragement of CSR became a central policy objective in the developed countries such as 
United States and European Union. See, Liu et al. (2018) 
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𝑡∗ = 𝑑 and 𝛼∗ =
4√𝐹
√6(𝐴−𝑑)−4√𝐹
 .                                                (25) 
where superscript “*” denotes the optimal solutions.  
Lemma 3 The optimal environmental tax is exactly determined at the level of marginal environmental 
damage in free entry market when the optimal degree of CSR is promoted. 
A few remarks are in order. First, accompanied with the optimal promotion of CSR, the optimal 
environmental tax is the same with marginal environmental damage, i.e., 𝑡∗ = 𝑡𝑃 = 𝑑 < 𝑡𝐹. Thus, the 
optimal promotion of CSR will reduce the optimal tax rate to the Pigouvian level, which will maximize 
the welfare than a higher taxation. Second, we have 𝛼∗
>
<
0 if F
<
>
3(𝐴−𝑑)2
8
 while 𝛼∗
>
<
1 if F
<
>
3(𝐴−𝑑)2
32
. 
Thus, the optimal promotion of CSR can be positive or negative and even it can be larger than full 
consideration of consumer surplus, depending on the entry cost. In particular, it should be negative if 
the entry cost is sufficiently large while it should be larger than one if the entry cost is sufficiently small. 
It implies that the excessive entry problem is serious, the role of CSR-firm should be highly emphasized. 
Finally, we have 
𝜕𝛼∗
𝜕𝐴
< 0, 
𝜕𝛼∗
𝜕𝑑
> 0 and 
𝜕𝛼∗
𝜕𝐹
< 0. This states that the optimal degree of CSR should be 
more promoted as (i) market size decreases, (ii) marginal environmental damage increases and (iii) entry 
cost decreases. 
Substituting the optimal degrees of CSR promotion and environmental tax into (8), we can obtain 
the equilibrium number of private firms: 
𝑛∗ =
𝐴−𝑑
2
√
6
𝐹
− 4 .                                                            (26) 
Note that the equilibrium number of private firms in (26) is smaller than that in the private market in 
(16), i.e., 𝑛∗ case. 𝑛𝑃 > 𝑛∗. Thus, the optimal promotion of CSR is effective to reduce excessive entry 
problem. 
Then, we have the equilibrium outputs as follows: 
𝑞0
∗ =
2√6𝐹
3
 , 𝑞𝑖
∗ =
√6𝐹
3
 ,
 
𝑄∗ = 𝐴 − 𝑑 −
2√6𝐹
3
 .                                       (27) 
Note also that the market output is the same as that in the private market in (17). Thus, the optimal 
promotion of CSR provides the same level of consumer surplus. 
Substituting also these outputs, we can obtain the profit of firm 0 as follows: 
𝜋0
∗ =
𝐹
3
 .                                                                   (28) 
Thus, the CSR-firm under the optimal promotion of CSR can earn a positive profit and survive in free 
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entry market. In sum, the emergence of CSR-firm can be beneficial to the society when an appropriate 
regulatory framework for the promotion of CSR is constructed. Therefore, the active role of 
governmental guideline for promoting CSR, rather than considering it on a voluntary basis, is imperative.  
    Finally, we obtain the consumer surplus, environmental damage and social welfare under the 
optimal promotion of CSR: 
𝐶𝑆 =
1
2
(𝐴 − 𝑑 −
2√6𝐹
3
)
2
, 𝐸𝐷 = 𝑑(𝐴 − 𝑑 −
2√6𝐹
3
), 𝑊 =
1
2
(𝐴 − 𝑑 −
2√6𝐹
3
)
2
+
𝐹
3
.          (29) 
These results show that consumer surplus and environmental damage are the same with the results in 
private market, but the social welfare can be enhanced. Then we obtain the following proposition. 
Proposition 2 The social welfare can be enhanced under the optimal promotion of CSR irrespective of 
the fixed cost. 
4.3. Comparisons with blockaded entry 
We compare with the blockaded entry case where the government can control the number of 
entering private firms in a mixed market.14 When a CSR-firm exists and the number of private firms is 
exogenously given, from (6) and (7), the social welfare becomes 
𝑊 =
(1+𝑛)(𝐴−𝑡)(𝐴(2−𝛼)(8+2𝑛+nα)+𝑡(8+4𝑛+nα2)−8𝑑(3+𝑛−𝛼))
8(3+𝑛−𝛼)2
− (𝑛 + 1)𝐹 .                (30) 
The differentiation of W  yields the following optimal environmental tax under blockaded entry: 
𝑡𝐵 = 𝑑 +
(4𝛼−4+𝑛𝛼2)(𝐴−𝑑)
8+𝑛(4+𝛼2)
 ,                                                  (31) 
where superscript “B” denotes the equilibrium outcome of the blockaded-entry mixed market. From 
(31), we have 𝑡𝐵
<
>
𝑑  when 𝛼
<
>
2(√1+𝑛−1)
𝑛
 . In special, 𝑡𝐵 < 𝑑  when 𝛼 = 0  while 𝑡𝐵 > 𝑑  when 
𝛼 = 1. Then we obtain the following lemma. 
Lemma 4 The optimal environmental tax is lower (higher) than marginal environmental damage when 
the degree of CSR is lower (higher) under blockaded entry. 
This result is comparable with the analysis of Lambertini and Tampiere (2015) and Leal et al. (2018) 
                                           
14 In reality, the government might not be able to control the number of private firms perfectly, on account of 
political and institutional interactions and/or the historical background of the regulated industry. For example, if 
private investors have already invested high fixed and sunk costs before an entry regulation is imposed, the 
government should consider the number of existing private firms as a fixed number. See Spiller (2013). 
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who considered Cournot duopoly and showed that CSR-firm produces larger output, which induces 
rivals to reduce their output. Thus, when the firm adopts CSR activities too high under blockaded entry, 
a higher taxation than the marginal environmental damage can be optimal to the society. This is in 
contrast to the results when the degree of CSR is higher in a private oligopoly under blocked entry, 
where the optimal environmental tax should be lower than the marginal environmental damage.15 It 
implies that under-production of the private firms is outweighed by over-production by the consumer-
friendly firm. Thus, a higher environmental tax will reduce production that is in excess of welfare 
maximization. In addition, the optimal tax increases as the number of private firms increases.  
The equilibrium outputs of the firms under blockaded entry are as follows: 
𝑞0
𝐵 =
2(2+𝑛𝛼)(𝐴−𝑑)
8+𝑛(4+𝛼2)
 , 𝑞𝑖
𝐵 =
2(2−𝛼)(𝐴−𝑑)
8+𝑛(4+𝛼2)
 ,
 
𝑄𝐵 =
4(1+𝑛)(𝐴−𝑑)
8+𝑛(4+𝛼2)
 .                         (32) 
Note again that the output of CSR-firm is larger than that of the private firm under blockaded entry, i.e., 
𝑞0
𝐵 > 𝑞𝑖
𝐵. Substituting these outputs, we can obtain the profits of the firms: 
𝜋0
𝐵 =
2(2+𝑛𝛼)(6−4𝛼−𝑛𝛼)(𝐴−𝑑)2
(8+4𝑛+𝛼2𝑛)2
− 𝐹 , 𝜋𝑖
𝐵 =
6(2−𝛼)2(𝐴−𝑑)2
(8+4𝑛+𝛼2𝑛)2
− 𝐹 .                         (33) 
Note that CSR-firm can earn non-negative profits at the blockaded-entry equilibrium only when 0 <
𝐹 <
2(2+𝑛𝛼)(6−4𝛼−𝑛𝛼)(𝐴−𝑑)2
(8+4𝑛+𝛼2𝑛)2
 under the optimal tax rate in (31). 
Finally, consumer surplus, environmental damage, and social welfare are follows: 
𝐶𝑆𝐵 =
8(1+𝑛)2(𝐴−𝑑)2
(8+4𝑛+𝛼2𝑛)2
 , 𝐸𝐷𝐵 =
4𝑑(1+𝑛)(𝐴−𝑑)
8+𝑛(4+𝛼2)
 , 𝑊𝐵 =
2(𝐴−𝑑)2(1+𝑛)
8+𝑛(4+𝛼2)
− (𝑛 + 1)𝐹 .            (34) 
Suppose that 0 < 𝐹 <
6(𝐴−𝑑)2(2−𝛼)2
(8+4𝑛+𝛼2𝑛)2
, where the private firm under both free entry and blockaded entry 
earns non-negative profit at equilibrium. Then, given 𝑛 = 𝑛𝐹 in (21), where the numbers of firms in 
both blockaded entry and free entry are the same, comparison between blockaded entry and free entry 
provides the following proposition. 
Proposition 3 The optimal tax under blockaded entry is lower than that under free entry when 𝑛 = 𝑛𝐹. 
Proof: Substituting (21) into (26) , we have 𝑡𝐵 =
√6(𝐴−𝑑)(4𝑑+𝐴𝛼2)+2(𝐴(4−2𝛼+3𝛼2−𝛼3)−2𝑑𝛼(1+𝛼))
(√6(𝐴−𝑑)−2√𝐹(1−𝛼))(4+𝛼2)
 when 
𝑛 = 𝑛𝐹 . And then comparing this value with (20) yields 𝑡𝐹 − 𝑡𝐵 =
4√𝐹(1−𝛼)(6𝐴−6𝑑+√6𝐹(𝛼+𝛼2))
3(√6(𝐴−𝑑)−2√𝐹(1−𝛼))(4+𝛼2)
> 0 
                                           
15 It is well-known that the optimal tax on private oligopoly under blockaded entry should be less than the marginal 
social damage, depending upon the relative effects of distortions such as market power and externality. See, for 
example, Lee (1999) and Lee and Park (2011). 
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when 0 < 𝐹 <
3(2−𝛼)2(𝐴−𝑑)2
2(6−3𝛼+𝛼2)2
. 
It states that a free-entry policy calls for a higher environmental tax even in the presence of CSR-firm 
because of the excessive entry problem, in which a higher taxation can reduce the number of firms but 
reduce the welfare, compared to the blockaded entry.  
Proposition 4 Both the environmental damage and social welfare under blockaded entry are higher 
than those under free entry when 𝑛 = 𝑛𝐹. 
Proof: Substituting (21) into (24) and (29), and then comparing the values yields (i) 𝐸𝐷𝐹 − 𝐸𝐷𝐵 =
−
4𝑑√𝐹(6𝐴−6𝑑−√6√𝐹(4−𝛼))(1−𝛼)
3(√6𝐴−√6𝑑−2√𝐹(1−𝛼))(4+𝛼2)
< 0 , and (ii) 𝑊𝐹 − 𝑊𝐵 = −
4𝐹(√6𝐴−√6𝑑−√𝐹(4−𝛼))(1−𝛼)2
3(√6𝐴−√6𝑑−2√𝐹(1−𝛼))(4+𝛼2)
< 0  when 
0 < 𝐹 <
3(2−𝛼)2(𝐴−𝑑)2
2(6−3𝛼+𝛼2)2
.  
Fig. 2 shows the simulation result of environmental damage and social welfare when 𝐴 = 𝐹 = 100 
and 𝑑 = 10 in both blockaded entry and free entry markets. It shows that the distorting effect under 
free entry can be reduced as the degree of CSR increases. It implies that the excessive entry problems 
call for a higher environmental taxation, but it depends on the degree of CSR. Therefore, the active role 
of governmental guideline for CSR, rather than considering it on a voluntary basis, is necessary. 
< FIGURE 2. The effects of entry regulation> 
4.4. Pollution abatement activities 
It is reasonable to expect that free entry may lead to some improvement in eco-technology because 
pollution production might be abated—with related processes becoming “greener”—in the long run. We 
consider the case that polluting firms can choose pollution abatement technology and examine how 
pollution abatement activities affect our results in a mixed market. For the simplicity of comparison 
without loss of further insights, in this section we assume that the weight assigned to consumer equals 
to zero, i.e., 𝛼 = 0 
Suppose that firm j chooses the pollution abatement level 𝑎𝑗. The emission level of each firm and 
market are given by 𝑒𝑗 = 𝑞𝑗 − 𝑎𝑗, and 𝐸 = 𝑒0 + ∑ 𝑒𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 , where firm j can reduce its emission 𝑎𝑗 by 
investing the amount 
1
2
𝑎𝑗
2 in pollution abatement activities.16 In the second stage, the CSR-firm and 
                                           
16 For simplicity of tractability, in line with the literature (Wang and Wang 2009, Lee and Park 2011, Kim et al 
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private firm simultaneously choose their levels of output and pollution abatement to maximized their 
objective functions. The equilibrium output and pollution abatement levels of the CSR-firm and private 
firm are 
𝑞0 =
𝐴−𝑡
2
, 𝑞𝑖 =
𝐴−𝑡
2(2+𝑛)
, 𝑎0 = 𝑎𝑖 = 𝑡.                                             (35) 
Note that environmental tax will not only reduce the output level but also the emission level, by inducing 
higher abatement activities. Thus, direct taxation effect has both the output-decreasing effect and the 
emission-decreasing effect. 
Then, the profits of the firms are as follows: 
𝜋0 =
(𝐴−𝑡)2(2−𝑛)
8(2+𝑛)
+
𝑡2
2
− 𝐹 , 𝜋𝑖 =
3(𝐴−𝑡)2
8(2+𝑛)2
+
𝑡2
2
− 𝐹 .                                  (36) 
Using the zero-profit conditions of the private firms under free entry, we can obtain the equilibrium 
number of private firms under free-entry conditions: 
𝑛 =
𝐴−𝑡
2
√
3
2𝐹−𝑡2
− 2 .                                                         (37) 
For a positive number of private firms, we assume that 0 < 𝐹 <
3𝐴2−6𝐴𝑡+19𝑡2
32
 . Note that the 
environmental tax will decrease (increase) the number of firms under free entry when the tax is low 
(high), that is, 
𝜕𝑛
𝜕𝑡
< 0 if 𝑡 <
2𝐹
𝐴
 while 
𝜕𝑛
𝜕𝑡
> 0 if 𝑡 >
2𝐹
𝐴
. This is in sharp contrast to the case without 
abatement activities. This is because the private firm has the option to reduce its emission level without 
lowering its output. Therefore, depending on the fixed cost, the indirect taxation effects to reduce the 
outputs of private firms will cancel out or exaggerate the direct taxation effects. 
Substituting the number of private firms, we can obtain the equilibrium output and emission levels 
of the firms and the market: 
𝑞0 =
𝐴−𝑡
2
, 𝑞𝑖 = √
2𝐹−𝑡2
3
, 𝑄 = 𝐴 − 𝑡 − 2√
2𝐹−𝑡2
3
, 
𝑒0 =
𝐴−3𝑡
2
 , 𝑒𝑖 = √
2𝐹−𝑡2
3
− 𝑡 , 𝐸 = 𝐴 −
3𝐴𝑡−7𝑡2+8𝐹
6
√
3
2𝐹−𝑡2
 .                            (38) 
We can confirm that direct taxation effects will reduce the outputs of the firms, but their effects on the 
outputs of the firms differ depending on the fixed cost and tax levels. However, owing to the indirect 
taxation effects on the number of firms, a low (high) environmental tax will decrease (increase) the 
                                           
2018), we focus on end-of-pipe abatement, which is additively separable. According to all empirical reports, end-
of-pipe abatement goods and services account for more than 70% of the pollution treatment sector. See David et 
al. (2011). 
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market outputs, i.e., 
𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝑡
< 0 when  𝑡 < √
6𝐹
7
, and 
𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝑡
> 0 when 𝑡 > √
6𝐹
7
. On the other hand, because 
of the direct taxation effects on the abatement activities, the environmental damage will decrease, i.e., 
𝜕𝐸
𝜕𝑡
< 0. 
The resulting CSR-firm’s profit, consumer surplus, environmental damage, and social welfare are 
as follows 
𝜋0 = (𝐴 − 𝑡)√
2𝐹−𝑡2
3
−
(𝐴+𝑡)(𝐴−3𝑡)
8
− 𝐹,   
𝐶𝑆 =
1
2
(𝐴 − 𝑡 − 2√
2𝐹−𝑡2
3
)2, 𝐸𝐷 = 𝑑(𝐴 −
3𝐴𝑡−7𝑡2+8𝐹
6
√
3
2𝐹−𝑡2
),  
𝑊 =
𝐹
3
+
9𝐴2−24𝐴𝑑+6𝐴𝑡+5𝑡2
24
− 4(4𝐴𝐹 − 8𝑑𝐹 − 3𝐴𝑑𝑡 + 4𝐹𝑡 + 𝐴𝑡2 + 7𝑑𝑡2 − 5𝑡3)√
3
2𝐹−𝑡2
 .  (39)                                              
Finally, if we evaluate the tax at the marginal environmental damage, the differentiation of W with 
respect to t yields the following: 
𝜕𝑊
𝜕𝑡
|
𝑡=𝑑
=
3𝐴+5𝑑
12
−
𝐴𝑑−3𝑑2+4𝐹
6
√
3
2𝐹−𝑑2
,                                           (40) 
where (40) 
>
<
0 when √2𝐹 − 𝑑2
>
<
2√3(𝐴𝑑−3𝑑2+4𝐹)
3𝐴+5𝑑
 . It shows that the optimal tax should be lower or 
higher than the marginal environmental damage, depending on the sizes of F and d. Again, this contrasts 
sharply with the case without abatement activities. This is because the indirect taxation effects to reduce 
the outputs of private firms can exaggerate the direct taxation effects, and thus, the market outputs will 
be reduced when the environmental tax is low. This emphasizes the importance of abatement technology 
in determining the optimal environmental tax under free entry equilibrium. 
When we evaluate the welfare with abatement activities in (39) at the optimal tax level without 
abatement activities in (20), we have that 
𝜕𝑊
𝜕𝑡
|
𝑡=𝑡∗
< 0 . It implies that the optimal tax with abatement 
activities should be lower than that without abatement technology. Thus, the abatement activities will 
reduce the optimal environmental tax under the free entry market. But, the number of private firms 
depends on the sizes of F and d. That is, 
𝜕𝑛
𝜕𝑡
< 0 if 𝑡 <
2𝐹
𝐴
 and 
𝜕𝑛
𝜕𝑡
> 0 if 𝑡 >
2𝐹
𝐴
. 
Proposition 5 Pollution abatement activities might reduce the optimal tax while increase the number of 
private firms when the tax is lower.   
Proof: Because of its analytic complexity, we employ a simple simulation and examine the comparative 
effects of abatement activities on the optimal tax and social welfare. Fig. 3 shows the simulation result 
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when 𝐴 = 100  and 𝑑 = 10 , where superscript “A” denotes the equilibrium outcome when the 
polluting firms can choose pollution abatement technology. 
< FIGURE 3. The effects of abatement activities > 
From Fig. 3, we can have 𝑡𝐴 < 𝑡𝐹, 𝑛𝐴 > 𝑛𝐹, 𝐸𝐷𝐹 > 𝐸𝐷𝐴 and 𝑊𝐴 > 𝑊𝐹. Thus, the eco-technology 
will reduce the optimal tax and increase the number of private firms. This will lead to an increase in the 
market output, while the total emission level decreases substantially on account of the existence of 
pollution abatement activities. Further, the abatement activities will increase not only consumer surplus 
but also social welfare. Thus, providing an efficient abatement technology in a free entry market is 
important to improve not only environment but also social welfare in the long run.   
5. Conclusions 
We have considered a consumer-friendly firm with CSR-initiatives in Cournot markets with 
endogenous entry and examined the effects of CSR on environmental tax and welfare consequences. We 
showed that the optimal tax under free entry is higher than that under blockaded entry and also higher 
than marginal environmental damage. However, we showed that a higher taxation is socially excessive 
from the viewpoint of socially optimal degree of CSR. Thus, the active role of governmental guideline 
for promoting CSR, rather than considering it on a voluntary basis, is necessary. This also implies that 
an appropriate regulatory framework for CSR promotion should be constructed. We further showed that 
the environment is less damaged but social welfare deteriorates accompanied with a CSR-firm when the 
fixed cost is low. However, we also showed that pollution abatement activities will reduce the optimal 
tax in free entry markets, but improves both environmental quality and social welfare. 
Our analysis should be extended to incorporate the general formulations of demand and cost 
functions.17 For example, it will be interesting to investigate the case that the consumer-friendly firm 
considers environmental damages in its objective function.18 Finally, we examined quantity competition, 
but price competition can be an alternative in oligopolistic competition. These challenging issues are 
promising future research. 
 
                                           
17 Lee (1999) shows that the optimal tax in a free-entry private market depends on the curvature of the market 
demand function, while Amir and Lambson (2000) point out the importance of the cost function in determining 
the output of an oligopoly. In a free-entry mixed market, Cato (2008) also shows that the optimality of privatization 
depends on the abatement cost function. 
18 See, for example, Kamijo and Tomaru (2014), Liu et al. (2015) and Lee and Xu (2018). 
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FIGURE 1. Welfare and profit comparisons under free entry 
 
  
FIGURE 2. The effects of entry regulation 
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FIGURE 3. The effects of abatement activities 
